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Lower bounds and impossibility results in distributed computing are both intellectually challenging
and practically important. Hundreds if not thousands of proofs appear in the literature, but
surprisingly, the vast majority of them apply to deterministic algorithms only. Probabilistic protocols
have been around for at least four decades and are receiving a lot of attention with the emergence of
blockchain systems. Nonetheless, we are aware of only a handful of randomized lower bounds.
In this work we provide a formal framework for reasoning about randomized distributed algorithms.
We generalize the notion of indistinguishability, the most useful tool in deterministic lower bounds,
to apply to a probabilistic setting. We apply this framework to prove a result of independent
interest. Namely, we completely characterize the quality of decisions that protocols for a randomized
multi-valued Consensus problem can guarantee in an asynchronous environment with Byzantine
faults. We use the new notion to prove a lower bound on the guaranteed probability that honest
parties will not decide on a possibly bogus value proposed by a malicious party. Finally, we show
that the bound is tight by providing a protocol that matches it.
This brief announcement consists of an introduction to the full paper [6] by the same title. The
interested reader is advised to consult the full paper for a detailed exposition.
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1 Introduction
Randomized algorithms have a long tradition in distributed computing [10], where they
have been applied to many different problems in a variety of models [8]. In the context
of fault-tolerant agreement they have served to overcome the impossibility of agreement
in asynchronous settings [5, 11, 2], and have significantly improved efficiency compared to
deterministic solutions [3, 7]. With the recent prevalence of blockchain systems, Byzantine
agreement algorithms that can overcome malicious parties have found renewed interest in
both industry and academia. For obvious reasons, blockchain systems should strive to
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minimize the share of decisions that originate from malicious parties, and to increase the
share originating from honest ones. A natural question, then, is what are the inherent limits
on the quality of Byzantine agreement algorithms in this regard? Namely, what can we say
about the probability with which an algorithm can guarantee that a good decision is made?
Given their practical importance, characterizing the power and limitations of randomized
distributed algorithms for agreement has become ever more desirable. However, obtaining
tight, or nontrivial, probabilistic bounds on properties in the asynchronous Byzantine
setting can be a challenging task. As is well known, there are “Hundreds of impossibility
results for distributed computing” [4]. But very few of them apply to randomized protocols.
Unfortunately, there is currently a dearth of general tools for characterizing the properties of
randomized algorithms.
The notion of indistinguishability has for years been one of the most useful tools for
proving deterministic lower bounds and impossibility results in distributed computing [1].
Such deterministic lower bounds typically rely on the fact that if a correct party cannot
distinguish between two executions of a deterministic protocol (i.e., its local state is the same
in both), then it performs the same actions in both. In a randomized algorithm, the fact that
two executions are indistinguishable to a given party up to a certain time does not ensure
that its next action will be the same in both. Moreover, a single execution does not, by
itself, provide information on the probability with which actions are performed. As a result,
the classic notion of indistinguishability does not directly capture many of the probabilistic
aspects of a randomized algorithm.
Of course, probabilistic properties of distributed algorithms such as “the probability that
the parties decide on a value proposed by an honest party is at least x” or “all honest parties
terminate with probability 1” cannot be evaluated based on an individual execution. Clearly,
to make formal sense of such statements, we need to define an appropriate probability space.
However, due the nondeterminism inherent in our model, a probability space over the set
of all executions cannot be defined (cf. [9]). This is because we can’t assume a distribution
over the initial configurations, and similarly there is no well-defined distribution on the
actions of the adversary, who is in charge of all the nondeterministic decisions. Once we
fix the adversary’s strategy, we are left with a purely probabilistic structure, which we
call an ensemble. An ensemble naturally induces a probability space. This allows us to
formally state probabilistic properties of an algorithm A of interest with respect to all of
its ensembles (= adversary strategies). E.g., “for every ensemble of algorithm A, all honest
parties terminate with probability 1.”
In deterministic algorithms, indistinguishability among executions is determined based on a
party pi’s local history, i.e., the sequence of local states that pi passes through in the executions.
We generalize the notion of an i-local history to a notion called an i-local ensemble. A local
ensemble is a tree of local states that captures subtle, albeit essential, aspects of probabilistic
protocols. This facilitates the definition of a notion of probabilistic indistinguishability
among ensembles, whereby two ensembles are considered indistinguishable to a process pi
if they induce identical i-local ensembles. Indistinguishability among ensembles provides a
formal and convenient framework that can be used to simplify existing lower bound proofs
in a probabilistic setting, and to prove new ones. A significant feature of this framework is
its simplicity and ease of use, allowing similar arguments as in the deterministic case. The
notions contain just enough structure beyond that of their deterministic analogues to capture
the desired probabilistic properties.
Our original motivation for developing the above framework was to formally prove
tight probabilistic bounds on the share of good decisions made by a randomized Byzantine
agreement algorithm in an asynchronous setting. In Section 5 of [6] we use probabilistic
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indistinguishability to prove that, roughly speaking, no algorithm can guarantee that the
probability to decide on a genuine input value is greater than 1 − fn−t . (As usual, n is the
total number of parties here, while t and f are the maximal and actual number of failures,
respectively.) Moreover, this bound is shown to be tight, by presenting an algorithm that
achieves it.
The paper makes two distinct and complementary main contributions:
We define a notion of indistinguishability that generalizes its deterministic counterpart,
and is suitable for proving lower bounds in the context of probabilistic protocols. A
new element in our definition is a purely probabilistic tree whose paths represent local
histories of a given process. The resulting framework provides an intuitive and rigorous
way to reason about probabilistic properties of such protocols.
We introduce Qualitative Validity, a new probabilistic validity condition for the Byzantine
agreement problem. It provides a probabilistic bound on the ability of corrupt parties to
bias the decision values, which is of interest in the blockchain arena. We prove that, in a
precise sense, it is the strongest achievable validity property in the asynchronous setting.
Both the statement of the property and the proof are facilitated by our new framework.
We now provide an informal description of the Qualitative Validity condition, and present
the lower bound and upper bound results regarding this condition that appear in the full
version [6]. Roughly speaking, we use f to denote the maximal number of failures that a
given adversary’s strategy allows to occur in any of its possible executions. In addition,
max_mult(Vin) denotes the multiplicity of the most frequent value in the input vector
(consisting of the initial values of the n parties).
▶ Definition 1 (Qualitative Validity). If max_mult(Vin) − f ≥ 2t + 1, then all honest parties
that decide, output decision values in Vin. Otherwise, the probability that they decide on a
value in Vin is at least 1 − fn−t .
Our main lower bound, which we prove using the probabilistic indistinguishability formalism
introduced in this work, is stated as follows:
▶ Theorem 2. No asynchronous Byzantine Agreement algorithm satisfies a validity property Φ
that is strictly stronger than Qualitative Validity even against a weak and static adversary.
In order to show that the lower bound result of Theorem 2 is tight, we present a Byzantine
agreement protocol that satisfies Qualitative Validity. As a result we obtain:
▶ Theorem 3. There exists an asynchronous Byzantine agreement algorithm that satisfies
Qualitative Validity against a strong and adaptive adversary.
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